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LOOKING BEYOND BATSON: A DIFFERENT METHOD OF
COMBATING BIAS AGAINST QUEER JURORS
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INTRODUCTION
On November 27, 1978, Harvey Milk, the first openly gay elected
official in California’s history, was murdered.1 He was shot five
times, twice in the head.2 His murderer, Dan White, was convicted
of voluntary manslaughter and served only five years in prison.3
The Dan White trial is the most famous example of queer juror
exclusion in American history.4 While White’s defense attorney,
Douglas Schmidt, could not directly ask the jurors about their
sexual orientation, he had another strategy: find the gays and allies
and keep them out, and find the Catholics and keep them in.5
Schmidt struck a woman who admitted to walking with some of her
friends at a gay pride parade; he kept a retired police officer.6 He
struck a young man who said he lived with a male roommate; he
kept the churchgoers.7 He asked everyone: “Have you ever sup-
ported controversial causes, like homosexual rights, for instance?”8
By the end of the jury selection process, the jury was entirely white
and heterosexual.9 And by the end of the trial, Dan White, who
lured Harvey Milk into an empty room and shot him twice in the
skull, was only convicted of voluntary manslaughter and served a
fraction of the time he would have received for a murder convic-
tion.10 After he was convicted, in a night of protests that became
known as the White Night Riots, crowds took to the street chanting,
1. RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE & TIMES OF HARVEY MILK xvi,
269 (1982).
2. See id. at 269.
3. Jay Mathews, Dan White Commits Suicide, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 1985), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/10/22/dan-white-commits-suicide/590322ca-f461-
4a98-9c5f-348648f7ac66/ [https://perma.cc/Q7YQ-R6NW].
4. Andy Birkey, Discrimination Against LGBT Jurors Remains Legal, HUFFPOST (May
1, 2012, 8:18 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/lgbt-discrimination-jurors_n_1466364.html
[https://perma.cc/R6J6-7PDR] (discussing juror dismissal based on sexual orientation in Dan
White’s trial).
5. See SHILTS, supra note 1, at 308-10.
6. Id. at 308-09.
7. Id. at 308.
8. Id. (emphasis omitted).
9. See id. at 309.
10. Id. at 269, 325.
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“All-straight jury. No surprise. Dan White lives. And Harvey Milk
dies.”11
The nation’s queer12 advocates were stunned.13 There was a
sense that “few judges in America would allow black jurors to be
systematically excluded from a jury weighing the murder of the
nation’s most prominent black public official.”14 At the time, of
course, there were no such protections for black jurors.15 Those
protections would not properly arise until 1986 with Batson v.
Kentucky,16 and even then, the protections would apply only to racial
(and later, gender17) classifications. No court would consider pro-
tecting queer jurors from peremptory strikes until 2014.18
In the past twenty years, scholars have started calling for an
expansion of the Batson rule to protect queer jurors.19 In 2014, the
Ninth Circuit became the first to rule that Batson applied in cases
of discrimination based on sexual orientation.20 It based its decision
partially on the contemporaneous United States v. Windsor ruling,
where the Supreme Court affirmed a Second Circuit decision that
relied on the understanding that classifications based on sexual
orientation were subject to heightened scrutiny.21 But while an
11. Birkey, supra note 4.
12. Queer is being used throughout this Note as an umbrella term that encompasses a
wide variety of sexual orientations and gender identities.
13. See, e.g., SHILTS, supra note 1, at 325-26 (detailing the visceral reaction of one queer
advocate upon hearing the jury’s verdict).
14. Id. at 308.
15. See Birkey, supra note 4.
16. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
17. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994).
18. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2014).
19. See, e.g., Vanessa H. Eisemann, Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation
and Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 26-27 (2001); Giovanna Shay, In the Box: Voir Dire
on LGBT Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407, 409 (2014); Julia C.
Maddera, Note, Batson in Transition: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges on the Basis of
Gender Identity or Expression, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 195, 197 (2016). But see Kathryne M.
Young, Outing Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir
Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 243, 243-46 (2011) (exploring the consequences of applying
Batson to sexual orientation).
20. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 475-76. The court specifically referred to “gays and lesbians”
in the opinion, thus leaving open the question of the ruling’s application to strikes based on
gender identity. See id. at 484.
21. See id. at 481-83. The scrutiny standard for sexual orientation and gender identity
classifications is still unclear. Id. at 480 (“Windsor, of course, did not expressly announce the
level of scrutiny it applied to the equal protection claim at issue in that case.”). For a detailed
1762 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1759
expansion of the Batson rule is both consistent with Supreme Court
precedent22 and necessary,23 it is not the only available solution to
the problem of bias against queer jurors, nor is it necessarily the
best one.24 This Note calls for a different solution—a rule that goes
beyond Batson and addresses both explicit and implicit bias, as well
as discriminatory motives obscured by facially neutral excuses.
Part I examines the constitutional and historical basis of the pe-
remptory challenge, the history of exclusion of protected classes
from the jury box, and the ruling, reasoning, and practical conse-
quences of Batson. Part II examines Batson’s shortcomings, first
looking at evidence of its failure to address racial disparities in ju-
ries, then at the issue of less visible class distinctions such as sex-
uality and gender identity and how those identities complicate the
problem of implicit bias and stereotyping. Part III examines
Washington’s newly implemented General Rule 37, which goes
beyond the Batson rule and limits peremptory strikes based on both
explicit and implicit bias, and attempts to ferret out impermissibly
discriminatory motives. Part III then explains how such a standard
could more effectively govern the discriminatory striking of queer
jurors at a national level. Part IV acknowledges the shortcomings
of a legislative approach to reforming the peremptory challenge rule
and addresses the potential dangers of so limiting the rule. 
I. A HISTORY OF UNEQUAL ACCESS TO THE JURY BOX
For most of American history, Americans were not judged by a
jury of their peers.25 At first, various openly discriminatory laws
kept women and people of color out of the juror pool entirely.26 But
analysis of the Windsor decision and the need for a clarified scrutiny standard for sexual
orientation and gender identity classifications, see generally Stacey L. Sobel, When Windsor
Isn’t Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal Protection Analysis for Sexual Orientation
Classifications, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2015).
22. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476 (applying Batson to striking the only gay juror).
23. For an examination of the consequences of removing members of vulnerable groups
from juries, see infra Part I.C.
24. See generally Young, supra note 19.
25. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 827-30 (1997), for a detailed account of the peremptory
challenge’s history in the United States and its origins in English law.
26. See id. at 828, 834 n.137.
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once the Court ruled such laws unconstitutional, lawyers and leg-
islators used other strategies—dishonest voir dire practices, costs
associated with jury participation,27 and explicit training in racist
and sexist jury selection—that all resulted in less diverse juries.28
Abuse of the peremptory challenge is one such strategy.29
A. The Controversy Surrounding the Peremptory Challenge
Though specific rules vary by jurisdiction, generally attorneys
have two tools during jury selection: strikes for cause and peremp-
tory strikes.30 Strikes for cause apply in cases of obvious bias, like
if a juror is related to a party or has some financial interest in the
litigation.31 Peremptory strikes are where Batson kicks in. Each
party gets a certain number of strikes that can be used for any
reason without stating a cause—unless, the Court in Batson held,
that cause is racial (or later, gender) bias.32
Scholars have been predicting the death of the peremptory chal-
lenge for decades.33 Critics believe that the peremptory challenge is
an insult to the democratic ideals of the country;34 skeptics believe
27. Hanna Kozlowska, Jury Duty Is Still an Expensive Waste of Time, Even Though US
Courts Know How to Fix It, QUARTZ (Apr. 10, 2017), https://qz.com/950121/jury-duty-is-still-
an-expensive-waste-of-time-even-though-us-courts-know-how-to-fix-it [https://perma.cc/X5RG-
H6VD].
28. For an example of the training methods used to encourage prosecutors to avoid
selecting black jurors, see McMahon Philadelphia DA Training Video (excerpts), YOUTUBE
(Nov. 7, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rv9SJPa_dF8 [https://perma.cc/9YSU-
ENB2] [hereinafter Training Video].
29. See Hoffman, supra note 25, at 846-49.
30. How Courts Work, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_
education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/juryselect
[https://perma.cc/9LN9-KH9Z].
31. Id. There is currently debate over whether a party should be able to strike jurors who
demonstrate antiqueer bias for cause. See, e.g., Shay, supra note 19, at 414.
32. How Courts Work, supra note 30.
33. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge, 80 A.B.A. J. 62, 62
(1994); see also Michael A. Cressler, Comment, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell for the
Peremptory Challenge?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 349, 350 (1992) (“[T]he potential for equal protection
claims against the exercise of peremptory challenges becomes incalculable.”); Christopher M.
Ferdico, Note, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge: J.E.B. v. Alabama, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1177, 1179 (1995) (“[T]he peremptory challenge has been eroded into nonexistence.”).
34. See Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1503, 1510 (2015).
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that peremptory challenges are ineffective in ensuring a fair trial;35
cynics argue that the peremptory challenge still exists only because
of its perceived deep historical roots.36 However, many scholars and
practicing attorneys argue that the peremptory challenge is not only
important because of its roots in the history of the jury, but because
it allows counsel to protect against biases that jurors will not admit
to during voir dire, or might not even be aware of themselves.37 It
also allows attorneys to have a more active role in juror selection. If
only strikes for cause existed, the judge would be in complete control
of the makeup of the jury.
The Supreme Court has both pleased and enraged those on
either side of the debate. It has held that “the Constitution does not
guarantee a right to peremptory challenges”38 and that mistaken
denial of a peremptory strike is not per se reversible error under
federal law or the Constitution.39 But the Court has also noted the
long history of peremptory strikes, including an eloquent and
lengthy tribute in Swain v. Alabama, the precursor to Batson.40 In
fact, when Batson was announced, Chief Justice Warren Burger was
so displeased by the majority’s failure to fully articulate the grand
legacy of the peremptory challenge that he took it upon himself to
do so.41 He quoted large sections of Swain and concluded that, if the
Court had bothered to consider the State’s interest in maintaining
the benefits of the peremptory rule, those benefits might very well
outweigh the equal protection challenge.42
Regardless of these ongoing fights over the value of the peremp-
tory rule generally, it is undeniable that the rule has grappled with
the Equal Protection Clause for centuries.43 Until the Reconstruc-
tion Era, lawyers rarely had to rely on the peremptory challenge to
35. See id. at 1526-27.
36. See Hoffman, supra note 25, at 812-13.
37. Roberts, supra note 34, at 1527-28.
38. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
39. Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160 (2009) (“To hold that a one-time, good-faith
misapplication of Batson violates due process would likely discourage trial courts and
prosecutors from policing a criminal defendant’s discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not compel such a tradeoff.”).
40. 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965).
41. See 476 U.S. at 112-34 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 119-25.
43. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205-07; see also Hoffman, supra note 25, at 827.
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exclude minority racial groups because the legal system simply
excluded them at the front end.44 But as the federal government
slowly brought an end to de jure segregation and more black poten-
tial jurors ended up in the venire, litigators began using peremptory
strikes as a way to keep them off of juries.45 This led to a series of
Supreme Court cases addressing, essentially, the de facto exclusion
of black jurors, all of which culminated in the current law: the
Batson challenge.46
B. Batson and Its Progeny
The facts of Batson are straightforward: an all-white jury con-
victed James Batson, a black man, of burglary, and on appeal,
Batson challenged the prosecutor’s jury selection process.47 Before
trial, the prosecutor had used his peremptory strikes to strike all
four of the black potential jurors.48 The lower court, relying on
Swain, held that Batson had not shown that the prosecution’s jury
selection process was generally racist across all its cases, only that
it might have been in this particular case.49 The Supreme Court re-
versed, and the new and highly controversial Batson standard was
born.50
Batson did two things: (1) it lowered the burden of proof so that
a defendant only needs to make a showing that the jury selection
was race-based in the defendant’s own case, rather than system-
atically across the jurisdiction;51 and (2) it established the test for
whether a peremptory challenge must be denied.52 A Batson chal-
lenge works like this: after one party makes a peremptory strike,
the other side objects, claiming racial bias.53 The striking party then
must offer a neutral reason for the strike.54 Importantly, the reason
44. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 827-30.
45. Id.
46. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99.
47. Id. at 82-83.
48. Id. at 83.
49. See id. at 83-84.
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 90-96.
52. Id. at 96-97.
53. Id. at 96.
54. Id. at 97.
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given by the striking party does not have to be, to use the Court’s
own word, “plausible”; it just needs to be neutral.55 The objecting
party then has an opportunity to try to prove that the strike was in
fact racially motivated.56
Since Batson, the Supreme Court has expanded the ruling sev-
eral times. It has held that Batson applies regardless of the race of
the defendant,57 that it applies to civil as well as criminal cases,58
and that lawyers can raise Batson challenges with strikes based on
gender as well as race.59 These cases prove an important point about
the nature of the rights that Batson protects: not just the right of
the defendant to have a jury of her peers, but the right of the juror
to serve.60 And it certainly seems that the Court was aware even at
the time of writing Batson that the decision went beyond the rights
of the defendant.61 In its decision, the Court noted that discrimina-
tory jury selection harms more than the defendant in a criminal
case, and in fact affects “the entire community” and “undermine[s]
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”62 All this
to say Batson is not just about criminal defendants getting a fair
trial under the Sixth Amendment. It is about the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection provisions as well.
J.E.B. v. Alabama, the case where the Court extended Batson to
gender, provides further insights about the Court’s purpose in
Batson.63 Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun recog-
nized the history of gender discrimination in the United States and
rejected the State’s argument that attorneys could assume that
women as a group would be more inclined toward emotional
decision-making.64 In a refrain familiar from Justice Blackmun’s
other equal protection cases, he denounced the use of “stereotypes”
that were once used to keep women from the public sphere
55. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
56. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. This is, to say the least, difficult to prove. See infra Part II.A.
57. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
58. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
59. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
60. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145-46.
64. See id. at 138-39.
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entirely.65 In this way, the Batson line of cases serves as both an
acknowledgement of the history of discrimination against certain
classes of jurors and recognition of the public distrust that juror dis-
crimination can cause. It is with this in mind that many scholars
have called for expanding Batson to sexual orientation and gender
identity.66
C. The Case for Extending Batson to Protect Queer Jurors
In ruling that Batson applied in cases with queer jurors, the
Ninth Circuit considered the history of queer discrimination in
America.67 While acknowledging that no laws explicitly banning
queer people from juries have existed, it noted that “[b]eing ‘out’ ...
is ... a relatively recent phenomenon,”68 and so the circumstances
are different than those considered in cases of racial bias.69 The
court noted in its decision that the number of Americans who per-
sonally knew someone who is gay rose from 25 percent in 1985 to 75
percent in 2000.70 By 2016, that number jumped to 87 percent.71
More people are out, so more people will be open about their iden-
tities in public settings like courtrooms; the problem of bias against
queer jurors is both new and growing.
A nationally mandated extension of Batson hinges on the
Supreme Court holding that queer people are a protected class
subject to heightened scrutiny—an argument that has been made
65. See id.
66. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
67. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 485-86 (9th Cir. 2014).
68. Id. at 485. Up until 2003, being out could result in grave legal consequences, including
incarceration. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578 (2003). Even though many
sodomy laws in the United States were rarely prosecuted in the years leading up to Lawrence
v. Texas, outing oneself to law enforcement, fellow jurors, or attorneys was significantly
harder in an era with those laws technically still on the books. See, e.g., id. at 573. This
stigma was essential in the holding of Lawrence. See id. at 575. Now, jurors must still worry
about employment discrimination and even physical harm when deciding whether to be
openly out. See Young, supra note 19, at 258.
69. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 485. The issue is somewhat (though not entirely) more analo-
gous to gender strikes—at the time of J.E.B., the presence of women on juries was relatively
recent. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131-32.
70. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 485-86.
71. Where the Public Stands on Religious Liberty vs. Nondiscrimination, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/28/where-the-public-stands-on-religious-
liberty-vs-nondiscrimination/ [https://perma.cc/5V9S-3CY3].
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repeatedly and in far more detail than this Note calls for.72 Absent
that standard, however, the legal exclusion of queer jurors could
have serious consequences. In a 1972 case, Justice Thurgood
Marshall noted that “[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of
the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove
from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps
unknowable.”73 He was right: diverse juries make better decisions.
One study showed what a striking difference having even one black
juror introduced to an all-white jury could make.74 While all-white
juries convicted black defendants 81 percent of the time and white
defendants 66 percent of the time, juries with at least one black
juror convicted black and white defendants at nearly identical rates
(71 percent and 73 percent respectively).75
Though there is no existing parallel study of juries involving
queer jurors, other research points to the need for a queer perspec-
tive in the jury box. Some examples: queer people are more likely to
be incarcerated and more likely to receive the death penalty;76
prosecutors are able to secure higher penalties, up to and including
the death penalty, for queer women who are perceived as more
masculine;77 juries perceive queer rape victims as somehow more
culpable, less sympathetic, or less believable than cisgender-
heterosexual victims;78 and, disturbingly, the gay panic defense is
still used in many jurisdictions.79 These instances of bias against
72. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1579, 1579 (2017); Sobel, supra note 21, at 499; James Lobo, Comment, Behind the Venire:
Rationale, Rewards and Ramifications of Heightened Scrutiny and the Ninth Circuit’s Ex-
tension of Equal Protection to Gays and Lesbians During Jury Selection in SmithKline v.
Abbott, 56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 106, 122 (2015).
73. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
74. Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON.
1017, 1019 (2012).
75. Id.
76. Michael B. Shortnacy, Comment, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American
Courtrooms: Sexual Orientation as a Tool for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty
Cases, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 309, 316-17, 332, 350 (2001).
77. See id.
78. Anna Wakelin & Karen M. Long, Effects of Victim Gender and Sexuality on
Attributions of Blame to Rape Victims, 49 SEX ROLES 477, 477-85 (2003).
79. The gay panic defense relies on juror homophobia as its base premise. It is a strategy
used most often in murder or assault cases where the defense attempts to establish the
sexuality of the victim as a mitigating factor or justification for the defendant’s violence. See
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queer defendants, witnesses, and victims would presumably be
reduced by the presence of queer jurors in the box.80 Unfortunately,
expanding Batson might not be enough to reduce instances of queer
juror exclusion.
II. BATSON ’S SHORTCOMINGS
When James Batson was sitting through the beginning stages
of his trial, he noticed right away that the prosecutor was striking
every black juror.81 He demanded his attorney object, and the at-
torney replied that he could not object—the prosecutor had done
nothing wrong.82 And when Batson finally convinced his attorney to
object anyway, the judge and the two lawyers had a conversation
that perfectly explains the state of the law at the time.83 The defense
counsel objected, the two lawyers made their way up to the bench,
and the defense counsel asked that the prosecutor explain his
strikes.84 Before the prosecutor could say a word, the judge inter-
rupted and said what was true of every peremptory strike at the
time: the prosecutor did not have to explain himself.85 It did not
matter that the jury was now entirely white.86 This was the law.
Introduction of the Gay and Trans Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2018, NAT’L LGBT B. ASS’N
(July 13, 2018), https://mailchi.mp/lgbtbar/gay-and-trans-panic-defense-prohibition-act-of-
2018 [https://perma.cc/G33B-WPYD].
80. Keeping in mind, of course, that “queer” here is being used as an umbrella term for
a reason; the queer community contains a wide variety of identities, and not all of those in the
community would necessarily act as advocates for those who identify with the other letters
in the LGBTQIA acronym. Transphobia, biphobia, and other intracommunity biases certainly
exist, but members of the community are also more likely to have positive attitudes toward
others who identify outside of the cisgender-heterosexual norm. Tiffani “Tie” S. Wang-Jones
et al., Comparing Implicit and Explicit Attitudes of Gay, Straight, and Non-Monosexual
Groups Toward Transmen and Transwomen, 19 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 95, 95, 101, 103
(2018).
81. Sean Rameswaram, More Perfect: Object Anyway, N.Y. PUB. RADIO 12:10-12:23 (July
16, 2016), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolabmoreperfect/episodes/object-anyway
[https://perma.cc/BF9H-YGQH].
82. Id.
83. See id. at 13:00.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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Batson makes illegal the openly discriminatory actions its name-
sake felt instinctively should not be allowed.87 For the first time, the
Court demanded a reason from lawyers invoking the age-old pe-
remptory challenge, and if that reason was race alone, the strike
could not stand.88 That was revolutionary; it was also not enough.
There is no shortage of criticisms of Batson from both sides of
the peremptory challenge debate. Those who wish to abolish pe-
remptory challenges say that Batson does not go far enough, while
those in favor of peremptory challenges say that Batson undercuts
one of the most powerful tools at a lawyer’s disposal.89 Batson
undeniably presents challenges in its practical application. For one,
“[t]he Batson test requires acts that its critics identify as very
difficult: for the lawyer, asserting that a colleague at the bar has
engaged in purposeful discrimination; for the judge, detecting and
declaring purposeful discrimination.”90 And that is just a problem
inherent with confronting explicit bias. Implicit biases—internalized
prejudices that the biased person is unaware of—fall entirely
outside the scope of Batson.91 The major criticism of Batson,
however, rests on how easy it is to circumvent.
A. The “Neutral Reason” Test
As noted above, each step of the Batson challenge presents
unique issues. Asserting that a colleague is engaging in racist voir
dire practices could understandably lead to strained working rela-
tionships between two attorneys, or between attorneys and judges.
But lawyers are trained (and paid) to navigate social conflict. The
true issue with Batson lies in its second step, wherein the striking
party provides a race-neutral reason for the strike.
87. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.
88. See supra Part I.B.
89. See Maddera, supra note 19, at 201-02.
90. Roberts, supra note 34, at 1511 (internal citations omitted). This point also brings to
mind Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion in Batson, where he expressed doubt that judges
would be willing to examine their own prejudices to properly enforce the rule. See infra notes
95-97 and accompanying text.
91. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (instructing trial courts “to determine
if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination” (emphasis added)).
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1. Explicit Bias and Pretense
In analyzing the neutral reason test, Morris Hoffman, a former
trial judge in favor of abolishing the peremptory rule, noted that “at
some point a sufficiently narrowed ‘race-neutral’ explanation can,
in fact, be a cover for race discrimination.”92 Another critic said,
more bluntly, “This is where ingenuity comes in. ‘Any lawyer worth
his or her salt can come up with a race neutral reason for the
strike.’”93
Peremptory strikes, by definition, can be based on anything that
is not a constitutionally impermissible bias. Reasons for strikes can
vary wildly: a lack of eye contact, a hostile or disinterested demean-
or, or even, “the mustaches and the beards look[ed] suspicious to
me,”94 are all considered sufficiently race-neutral reasons. The text
of Batson does not require a judge to confirm that a juror was, in
fact, hostile to the striking party. Under Batson, if the reason is
race-neutral (though implausible), the strike stands. So even in the
easiest cases where lawyers are consciously aware of their race-
based motivations, the neutral reason test provides easy cover. A lie,
even a bad one, is enough for lawyers who are intentionally angling
to remove jurors of a certain race to survive a Batson challenge. But
the issue gets even more complicated when a lawyer makes a race-
based strike because of an internalized bias that they themselves
are unaware of.
2. Implicit Bias and Good Intentions
Prejudice does not always take the form of overt racism or con-
scious stereotyping. In his concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall
agreed “wholeheartedly” with the premise that some prosecutors
used the peremptory challenge to eliminate black jurors in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, and lauded the Court for taking “a
historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial
92. See Hoffman, supra note 25, at 836-37 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 775
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
93. Curriden, supra note 33, at 62.
94. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995).
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discrimination in the selection of juries.”95 However, lines later, he
worried that Batson would do little to eliminate less-obvious preju-
dice from the courtroom: the “unconscious racism” that would drive
judges to accept “neutral reasons” clearly driven by racial stereo-
types.96 To do otherwise, he said, would require all court actors “to
confront and overcome their own racism,” a tall order for even the
most well-intentioned lawyer.97 In saying so, Justice Marshall pre-
dicted the Batson rule’s future struggle with implicit bias.
Harvard’s “Project Implicit” has tested over two million individu-
als for unconscious biases based on factors such as race, gender,
sexuality, weight, and disability, using Implicit Association Tests
(IATs).98 The results of the race IAT show that average white
Americans in every single state are moderately to highly biased
against African Americans.99 Those results are skewed by the fact
that the test is voluntary and self-selecting—the only people taking
the test are those who specifically seek it out and want to study
their own biases.100 This means that the test-takers tend to be youn-
ger, more liberal, and more highly educated than the average
American, and those not included in the Project Implicit sample
may actually be even more biased.101
Implicit bias is especially problematic in the context of Batson
because establishing a violation based on an attorney’s unconscious
prejudice is nearly impossible. If finding racist motivations under
95. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102, 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 106.
97. Id.
98. Chris Mooney, Across America, Whites Are Biased and They Don’t Even Know It,
WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/
12/08/across-america-whites-are-biased-and-they-dont-even-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/C4LK-
J3CK]; About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/aboutus.html
[https://perma.cc/46BH-BMGH].
99. Mooney, supra note 98. Project Implicit’s IATs look for associations between faces and
words or concepts. For example, test-takers might first be asked to assign black faces and
“good” words to the left side of the screen and white faces and “bad” words to the right side
of the screen. The IAT then measures the time it takes, in milliseconds, for the test-taker to
sort the images correctly, then switches the pairing (black faces with “bad” and white with
“good”) and compares the times and amount of mistakes made. The disparity gives the overall
score; any number over 0 indicates a preference for white faces while any number under 0
indicates a preference for black faces. The average score nationwide is .402, which falls into
the category of “strongly prefers whites.” Id.; see also PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 98.
100. Mooney, supra note 98.
101. Id.
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the neutral reason test is hard when attorneys are deliberately
concealing their motives, it becomes much harder when attorneys
genuinely believe that their strikes are motivated by intuition
rather than implicit bias.
3. The End Results
A 1996 study that sampled every case involving a Batson chal-
lenge from 1986 to 1993 painted a grim picture of Batson’s effects:
only 17 percent of the objections succeeded.102 The Washington
Supreme Court came to a similarly disappointing result when
reviewing their state’s application of Batson.103 In a case preceding
the adoption of Washington’s General Rule 37, discussed below, the
majority wrote a scathing critique of the way jury selection worked
in their state, even following Batson.104 Quoting Justice Stephen
Breyer,105 the Washington Supreme Court referred to studies that
showed, among other troubling statistics, “race-based uses of
prosecutorial peremptories declined by only 2% after Batson”; that
“Batson challenges’ success rates [were] lower where peremptories
were used to strike black, rather than white, potential jurors”; and
“that few Batson challenges succeed.”106 Narrowing their focus to
Washington, the court went on to say, “In over 40 cases since
Batson, Washington appellate courts have never reversed a
conviction based on a trial court’s erroneous denial of a Batson
challenge.”107 In the end, they concluded, “[I]t is evident that Batson,
like Swain before it, is failing us.”108
102. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 459 (1996).
103. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334 (Wash. 2013).
104. Id. at 334-35.
105. Justice Breyer, concurring in a 2005 case, expressed deep concerns about the
usefulness of Batson and the ability of lawyers to easily circumvent the neutral reason rule.
See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266-72 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
106. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 334 (internal citations omitted).
107. Id. at 335.
108. Id. at 334.
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B. Invisible Identities and Identifying Bias
The neutral reason rule has issues even in gender and racial
applications. But when it comes to queer identities, the problems get
even more complex. In SmithKline, when the trial judge decided to
disallow a Batson challenge to a peremptory strike on a gay juror,
he relied on three factors. First, the trial judge assumed that Batson
did not apply to queer jurors, a position the Ninth Circuit later
rejected.109 Second, he believed (incorrectly) that Batson did not ap-
ply to civil cases.110 Third—the point most relevant to this Note—he
pointed out that sexuality is not a visible trait.111 How could he
know that the striking attorney really relied on the juror’s sexuality,
when it was possible that the attorney did not know the man was
gay?112
The underlying case behind the Ninth Circuit’s decision arose
out of a contract dispute between two drug companies, Abbott and
GSK, regarding pricing of a drug used in treating HIV/AIDS.113
During voir dire, one juror mentioned that he had a male partner.114
Abbott moved to strike the juror.115 In this case, the striking at-
torney agreed to rest on the trial judge’s three given reasons,
essentially admitting to striking the juror due to his sexuality.116
But what if the attorney’s reasoning had been that the juror had
just seemed like he would be biased in a case involving HIV/AIDS?
Such an assumption would be facially neutral, even if Batson had
applied to sexuality in the Ninth Circuit at the time. It does not
matter that the lawyer would not have anything to base that
assumption on: remember, neutral reasons do not need to be
plausible.117
109. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
the trial transcript).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. Said attorney, of course, agreed with the judge, stating that he had “no idea”
if the juror was gay or not, despite the juror’s earlier mention of a male partner in voir dire.
Id.
113. Id. at 474.
114. Id. at 475.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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In other words, queer people have—and are assumed to have—
experiences that cisgender-heterosexual people do not. Some exam-
ples: poor experiences during early education such as harsher
treatment by school administrators, bullying from peers, and strict
dress codes that do not allow for gender expression, which can all
lead to behavior that increases the likelihood of criminal activity
later in life.118 Accordingly, out queer children make up approxi-
mately 7 to 8 percent of the nation’s population, but approximately
13 to 15 percent of the juvenile justice system.119 Queer people are
also more likely to end up homeless and more likely to experience
poverty than cisgender-heterosexual people,120 and poverty and
homelessness have long been associated with increased levels of
incarceration.121 They are also situated against authority early on;
even youth growing up in a post-Obergefell era recognize the history
of state-sponsored discrimination against their queer predecessors,
and can be wary of law enforcement as a result.122 Trans people,
particularly trans women of color, are profiled as sex workers by
police and are more likely to be arrested.123 Famously, queer people
118. SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, ABA, SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE:
PRELIMINARY REPORT 24, 41 (2016), https://www.ncbar.org/media/708831/school-to-prison-
pipeline-preliminary-report-complete-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC8W-MU2G].
119. SHANNAN WILBER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE 11 (2015),
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/AECF_LGBTinJJS_FINAL_Sept-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TC7X-KRCV]; Angela Irvine, “We've Had Three of Them”: Addressing the
Invisibility of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Gender Non-Conforming Youths in the Juvenile
Justice System, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 675, 676-77 (2010).
120. Randy Albelda et al., Poverty in the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Community (Cal. Ctr.
Population Research, Working Paper No. CCPR-2009-007, 2009), http://papers.ccpr.ucla.edu/
index.php/pwp/article/view/ CCPR-2009-007 [https://perma.cc/HE3K-D5W9].
121. For a discussion of the connection between poverty and crime and the invisible crimes
of the rich, see generally JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE
POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (11th ed. 2017).
122. See generally Erica L. Ciszek, Identity, Culture, and Articulation: A Critical-Cultural
Analysis of Strategic LGBT Advocacy Outreach (June 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Oregon), https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/18364/
Ciszek_oregon_0171A_10974.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VY8-8ZRP].
123. CATHERINE HANSSENS ET AL., A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE: FEDERAL POLICY RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE AND PEOPLE LIVING
WITH HIV 5 (2014), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-
sexuality/files/roadmap_for_change_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRG4-XBCV].
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often have negative associations with religion;124 less famously,
people on the queer spectrum, especially trans people, often have
negative experiences with healthcare.125
These studies show the experiences of many—but not all—queer
people. But, in a world obsessed with demographics, attorneys may
choose to rely on these statistics as shortcuts during voir dire. So,
should an attorney be able to ask questions about a trans woman’s
interactions with the police when the other jurors were not ques-
tioned? Should that attorney be able to ask about a gay juror’s ex-
perience or lack thereof with homelessness? With doctors? With
religion?126
Assume that one day the Supreme Court holds, as the Ninth
Circuit did, that Batson applies in cases of discrimination against
queer jurors. How would that be implemented? In her article Outing
Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of
Modern Voir Dire, Kathryne Young outlines the practical problems
with applying Batson to queer jurors, each of which will be ad-
dressed below.127
The first issue is the problem of identification. Batson challenges
are currently uncomplicated at this step; a party strikes a juror, and
the opposing side objects, saying something along the lines of, “That
juror is black, and you struck her because she is black.” But in cases
of sexuality or gender identity, the juror in question might never
explicitly reveal her sexuality. In fact, the identification of queer
jurors on sight might rely on the very stereotypes that Justice
Blackmun warned against in J.E.B.128 A jury member’s manner of
124. See Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex
Marriage: Two Are Better than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8-31 (tracing the religious roots
of the movement against same-sex marriage).
125. See Laura E. Durso & Ilan H. Meyer, Patterns and Predictors of Disclosure of Sexual
Orientation to Healthcare Providers Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals, 10 SEXUALITY
RES. & SOC. POL’Y 35, 36 (2013) (explaining that, while most patients would prefer to disclose
their sexuality or gender identity to their physicians, many are reluctant to do so).
126. Washington has identified the same problem regarding questions posed to people of
color and not white people during voir dire; for further discussion of this issue, see infra Part
III.A.
127. See generally Young, supra note 19.
128. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (“The community is harmed
by the State’s participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the
inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the
courtroom engenders.”).
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dress may be a perfectly acceptable neutral reason for a peremptory
challenge under Batson.129 For queer people, manner of dress could
be a large part of the reason a striking attorney assumes the juror
is queer. Would “manner of dress” then be an impermissible reason
for a strike? Under the Batson standard, it would not be, as that
would rely on an understanding of bias and pretense that Batson
simply does not allow for.130
Even more troublingly, applying Batson could lead to jurors
being outed against their wishes,131 a process that might turn them
against the party asking the question or, worse, cause them embar-
rassment or even physical danger.132 As Young notes, one alter-
native could be in camera questioning as a solution to the outing
problem.133 But as she points out, not only will most jurors still feel
uncomfortable discussing their sexuality in front of a judge even
away from the other jurors, but such questioning also sends the
message that queer identities are abnormal or shameful, while some
straight and cisgender jurors might be offended at being mistaken
as queer.134
Batson’s failure to address both pretense and implicit bias
makes it difficult to apply in a racial context and nearly impossible
to apply to invisible identities. In an effort to address the problem
129. If a mustache is acceptable under the standard, one must assume that a person’s
manner of dress is also acceptable. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Some courts
have so held, allowing strikes based on “baggy” clothing. Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu,
Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Un-
imaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2011).
130. For an example of the problem, consider the hypothetical posed in Kathryne Young’s
article:
Prosecutor: She doesn’t seem gay to me, Your Honor. That didn’t even cross my
mind.
Defense attorney: Oh, come on. Short hair, no wedding ring, baggy jeans, and
she plays in two adult softball leagues.
Prosecutor: I didn’t look at her jeans. But she’s carrying a purse. That doesn’t
seem very homosexual.
Defense attorney: It’s not a purse, it’s a messenger bag. Your Honor, whether
she’s gay or straight, she’s a walking stereotype.
Young, supra note 19, at 257-58.
131. Unsurprisingly, most jurors prefer not to out themselves; in one study, “more than half
of gay and lesbian court users preferred not to” when the issue arose. Id. at 256.
132. Id. at 258.
133. Id. at 259.
134. Id.
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of racial Batson challenges, the Washington Supreme Court has
implemented a new system that addresses both of these problems;
such a system could be the solution those who wish to protect queer
jurors from discriminatory strikes are looking for, without imple-
menting the more drastic and controversial change of abolishing
peremptories entirely.
III. WASHINGTON’S NEW RULE
In 2017, Washington held a symposium addressing issues of
racial discrimination in the court system.135 At this symposium,
participants heard testimony from a black woman who had been
removed from jury duty for no reason that she could understand.136
The woman, who chose to remain anonymous, explained how the
experience had humiliated and degraded her, shaking her faith in
the justice system as a whole.137
The Washington Supreme Court’s evaluation of the symposium
and the general history of Batson challenges in the state resulted in
the court calling on the ACLU and a collection of activist groups to
draft a new rule that would expand and replace Batson; this rule
would address not only explicit racial bias, but also implicit bias and
pretense.138
A. An Overview of General Rule 37
Washington’s General Rule 37 (GR 37) expressly attempts to
“eliminate the unfair exclusion of potential jurors based on race or
ethnicity.”139 The first part of a GR 37 challenge is nearly identical
to a typical Batson challenge: the party opposing a peremptory
strike (or the court itself) objects to the strike for reason of improper
135. Washington Supreme Court Is First in Nation to Adopt Rule to Reduce Implicit Racial
Bias in Jury Selection, ACLU (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/washington-
supreme-court-first-nation-adopt-rule-reduce-implicit-racial-bias-jury [https://perma.cc/9QPJ-
42PU] [hereinafter ACLU].
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(a).
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bias.140 The party striking must then respond with a neutral reason
for the strike.141 From there, the process is far more rigorous than
Batson: “If the court determines that an objective observer could
view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge, then the peremptory challenge shall be denied. The court
need not find purposeful discrimination to deny the peremptory
challenge.”142 The rule goes on to define the “objective observer” as
one who “is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious
biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the
unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.”143
Next, the court created an extensive list of situations that might
indicate the need for a Batson challenge:
(i) the number and types of questions posed to the prospective
juror, which may include consideration of whether the party
exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the
prospective juror about the alleged concern or the types of
questions asked about it;
(ii) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked
significantly more questions or different questions of the
potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used
in contrast to other jurors;
(iii) whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers
but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party;
(iv) whether a reason might be disproportionately associated
with a race or ethnicity; and
(v) whether the party has used peremptory challenges dispropor-
tionately against a given race or ethnicity, in the present case or
in past cases.144
The court went even further, ensuring that discretion of trial judges
would not allow for even unconsciously biased rulings on peremp-
tory strikes. In Washington, attorneys can no longer strike jurors for
distrusting or having prior contact with law enforcement, living in
a high-crime neighborhood, having a child outside of marriage,
140. Id. at 37(c).
141. Id. at 37(d).
142. Id. at 37(e) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 37(f).
144. Id. at 37(g).
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receiving state benefits, or not being a native English speaker.145
Under Batson, such reasons would have been considered sufficiently
neutral to defeat a challenge.146 To further ensure compliance with
the new standard, the court added a list of reasons that were not
presumptively invalid by law, but that ought to be treated with
suspicion: “allegations that the prospective juror was sleeping,
inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact; exhibited a
problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor; or provided un-
intelligent or confused answers” will be accepted as valid only if the
juror’s behavior is corroborated by the judge or opposing counsel.147
This rule contains language that addresses several of the
previously discussed issues with Batson: (1) it addresses the issue
of pretense by identifying facially neutral reasons that have
historically been used to strike jurors of color, and deeming them
presumptively invalid; (2) it accounts for problems of implicit bias
by specifying that no purposeful discrimination is necessary to
sustain a Batson challenge; and (3) it casts suspicion on the practice
of extensively questioning certain classes of jurors who the lawyer
assumes (based on stereotypes) will have certain biases.
At the time of this writing, the Washington Supreme Court has
not yet grappled with GR 37 and has only held in a single case that
it did not apply retroactively.148 Time will tell if GR 37 challenges
actually succeed more often than Batson challenges and accomplish
the goal of diminishing voir dire bias against jurors of color.
Regardless, it provides an interesting framework on which to base
legislation that could apply to currently unprotected marginalized
groups.
B. How Washington’s Rule Could Apply to Queer Jurors
GR 37 addresses biases historically held against people of color,
whether explicit or implicit. A rule for strikes based on sexual ori-
entation and gender identity would follow GR 37's example by
looking at historical biases against queer people and prohibiting
145. Id. at 37(h)(i-vii).
146. See supra Part II.A.
147. WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(h)(i).
148. State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 477 (Wash. 2018) (“The question is whether GR 37
nevertheless applies to this case. This is a long analysis, but the answer is no.”).
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strikes and lines of questioning based on such biases. It would also,
as in GR 37, allow a judge to find that a strike was made based on
implicit bias, eliminating the need to out jurors in order to preserve
their rights.
1. Examples of Presumptively Invalid Reasons
The neutral reason loophole is easy enough to abuse when
applied to race and gender, which are readily apparent traits in
most cases. When dealing with a less visible trait such as sexuality
or gender identity, which relies nearly entirely on judgments based
on stereotypes or direct questioning, applying Batson would curtail
only those attorneys who make the mistake of being open about
their discriminatory reasoning.149
In creating their list of presumptively invalid reasons, the
Washington court relied on factors historically associated with ra-
cial stereotypes such as prior police interactions, neighborhoods,
and mannerisms.150 Consider a GR 37 that went beyond race: such
a list, when adjusted for stereotypes related to gender expression
and sexuality, could include feminine or masculine mannerisms,
choice of dress, or haircuts. It could also, as mentioned above, in-
clude past experiences with police, with doctors, or with religion.151
It could, to return to Harvey Milk, include reasons such as walking
in a pride parade, or living with a male roommate.152 Such a list
could remove the problem of pretense and, presumably to Justice
Blackmun’s satisfaction, limit the use of stereotypes as a shortcut
in voir dire and force lawyers to dig deeper into whether a juror
might be biased.153 By making the reasons presumptively invalid,
the rule also cuts down on the use of neutral reasons that might be
relevant to a particular case but are correlated with a specific group.
149. See Young, supra note 19, at 269. See generally Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 129.
150. See ACLU, supra note 135.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25.
152. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
153. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138-40 (1994).
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2. Lines of Questioning
Consider the SmithKline case.154 There, the attorney, instead of
striking the juror just after learning about his male partner, began
an intense line of questioning. Do you know anyone with HIV? Do
you know what medications those people take?155 These suspicious
questions would be perfectly permissible under Batson, but under
GR 37, would provide a cue for the court or the opposing party to
raise an objection and examine the lawyer’s motivations for evidence
of prejudice.156
This also applies if the lawyer asked these questions across the
board. Assume the juror in question answered affirmatively to
knowing someone affected by HIV/AIDS, but the lawyer, instead of
singling him out, then asked every other juror the same question. If
no other jurors answered affirmatively, maybe there would be a
legitimate reason for the strike. But if another juror said “yes, I
know someone with AIDS,” and the lawyer chose to use his strike
only on the gay juror, GR 37 would require the opposing attorney or
the court itself to object.157
3. Implicit Bias 
Implicit bias, when applied to queer people, is difficult to define.
Different kinds of implicit bias exist; for some queer people, clues
about their identity are often visible, but this may not result in
explicit bias. Take the following example. An attorney speaks to a
gay woman during voir dire. The woman exhibits more stereotyp-
ically masculine traits in both her manner of dress and conversa-
tion. The attorney might not immediately, consciously think, “I
think she’s a lesbian, so now I think X about her.” However, the
attorney might recognize those traits and, on a subconscious level,
begin associating the woman with all the stereotypes lesbians are
associated with. That is what makes the issue different from the
issue of racial bias: the attorney does not even need to know (or
154. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
155. Id. at 474-75.
156. See supra text accompanying note 144.
157. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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think they know) the juror’s gender identity or sexuality to begin
making assumptions.
There is still, of course, the usual implicit bias problem. In
SmithKline, the struck juror’s same-sex partner came up during voir
dire.158 Even if a lawyer made no conscious decisions based on this,
the lawyer might then view the juror’s answers in a different light,
or ask more questions based on some sort of “hunch.”
Because of situations such as this, the implicit bias question is
addressed by the GR 37 provision that no intentional discrimination
is necessary.159 The first problem—implicit bias based on stereo-
typing rather than direct knowledge—is deterred by the list of
presumptively invalid reasons to strike in combination with the lack
of an intentional discrimination requirement.160 The second
problem—knowledge leading to unconscious suspicion—is deterred
by the limitations on individual questioning in combination with
that same intentional discrimination provision.161
IV. OBJECTIONS
A. The Issues with a Legislative Approach
The advantage of Batson, of course, is that it is embedded in the
Constitution,162 and any Supreme Court ruling expanding Batson
would apply nationwide. A state-by-state legislative approach will
result in slow, fragmented progress; and, because such protections
would likely come out of states already willing to protect the rights
of queer citizens, the states where attitudes toward queer people are
most biased—and thus, where such protections would be most
necessary—are unlikely to take such action. This is why
Obergefell163 mattered, even though same-sex marriage advocates
were gaining ground in the states.164
158. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474.
159. WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(e)-(f).
160. Id. at 37(e)-(g).
161. Id.
162. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
163. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to provide marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
164. Id. at 2597.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to change the
Batson challenge’s structure, even in the face of its empirical failure
to address the discriminatory use of peremptories.165 This might be
due to the concerns over limiting the peremptory rule, as discussed
below,166 or might simply be a reluctance to tackle the issue again.
Regardless, even if the Court did decide to change the Batson
framework, it would also need to (1) change the scrutiny standard
for gender identity and sexuality classifications to strict (or at least
intermediate) scrutiny, and (2) rule that Batson applies to those
classifications as well.167 With all of those preconditions, a slow,
fragmented legislative approach might actually bring quicker
results.
Additionally, it is unlikely that a decision would come up with
rules as specific as the language of GR 37. Constitutional standards
are malleable and subject to interpretation—and therefore subject
to clever circumvention.168 A statute could provide workable, precise
rules for lawyers and judges, and avoid the issues involved in
Batson’s “neutral reason” test.
To be clear, this Note does not argue against adopting the
Batson standard for queer jurors. It simply suggests that such a
change would not be enough to guard against the kinds of bias that
deny queer people equal access to the jury box. And if GR 37 seems
like a radical and unreachable goal, the reactions of various
Washington groups might provide some insight to the contrary.
Unsurprisingly, the Washington ACLU—one of the original
drafters of the new rule, along with the Legal Voice, the Loren
Miller Bar Association, the Latino/a Bar Association of Washington,
and the Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle Univer-
sity School of Law—considered it a victory.169 A senior staff attorney
for Washington’s ACLU touted the rule as a “groundbreaking” move
toward promoting the integrity of the judicial system and reducing
damage done to communities of color who had been unfairly ex-
cluded in the past.170 More notably, Washington Attorney General
165. See supra Part II.A.3.
166. See infra Part IV.B.
167. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
169. See ACLU, supra note 135.
170. Id.
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Bob Ferguson also spoke highly of the change, saying, “This is a
significant and overdue step that will help ensure juries represent
the communities they serve.”171 The Washington Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers joined in the praise, and in fact aided in
drafting the rule.172 Seeing a positive reaction from a civil rights
advocacy group such as the ACLU is no surprise, but seeing positi-
vity from groups who will be directly affected—and in some cases,
limited—by the rule speaks to an understanding in the community
that something needs to change.
B. The Dangers of Taking the Teeth Out of the Peremptory Rule
Because GR 37 is so recent, there has been almost no discussion
of its implications for the use of the peremptory rule in Washington
generally. But the argument is not difficult to predict. The list of
factors that are presumptively invalid under the new law is an
extensive one,173 and expanding such a rule to gender and sexuality
biases might result in a list of factors so long that peremptory
challenges would nearly always be subject to an objection.
Some would argue that this would effectively eliminate the
peremptory rule, which would be a hindrance to attorneys who use
it to try to provide their clients with a fair trial. But consider the
opposite view: the peremptory rule itself is so easy to abuse that if
it must remain a part of voir dire, it must also be subject to strict
limits to ensure it is not used to inappropriately discriminate
against marginalized groups.174 In other words, if muzzling the pe-
remptory challenge is what is necessary to restore faith in the
justice system,175 ensure equal participation in the jury box,176 and
create more diverse and thoughtful juries to decide disputes that
171. Sydney Brownstone, Washington Courts Now Have the Country’s First Rule for
Tackling Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, STRANGER (Apr. 10, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.
thestranger.com/slog/2018/04/10/26024644/washington-courts-now-have-the-countrys-first-
rule-for-tackling-implicit-bias-in-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/EXN6-XGD5].
172. See ACLU, supra note 135.
173. See supra text accompanying note 144.
174. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 871.
175. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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may end in the destruction of liberty or property,177 then courts have
a responsibility to do so. Additionally, a long list of factors is not an
infinite list. Lawyers would still be free to exercise peremptory
strikes based on answers to voir dire questions, a juror’s occupation,
or other innocuous traits. They would just find it harder to make up
a nondiscriminatory reason when the purpose was, in fact, dis-
criminatory, whether they knew it or not.
CONCLUSION
While an expansion of Batson would certainly be a victory for
those advocating for protections for queer jurors, much like
Obergefell was for advocates of same-sex marriage, it would not be
the end of the fight. Discrimination against queer people is far-
reaching, and can rely on insidious and unconscious biases that can
result as easily from masculine or feminine presentation as from
explicit knowledge of a same-gender partnership.178 Batson is unable
to fully combat those biases. It allows for facially neutral observa-
tions, such as manner of speech or dress or past interactions with
police, to serve as scapegoats for peremptory strikes actually
motivated by animus and stereotyping.179 To truly ensure that
peremptory strikes comply with equal protection, something beyond
Batson is necessary. Washington’s General Rule 37 is a good
example of a potential legislative solution to the problem: by pro-
viding examples of presumptively invalid “neutral reasons” for
peremptory strikes, it curbs attempts to circumvent the Batson rule
with pretense.180 Those same presumptively invalid reasons guard
against overuse of neutral reasons basing the strike on traits more
often found in queer people. And by allowing Batson challenges to
succeed even when a judge finds no evidence of deliberate discrimi-
nation, Washington’s rule introduces implicit bias to the Batson
analysis for the first time.
177. As mentioned above, diverse juries make better decisions; having a more thoughtful
and thorough analysis is essential to the justice system. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text. Unless, of course, you are deliberately attempting to undermine it. See Training Video,
supra note 28.
178. See supra Part II.
179. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part III.B.
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Systemic exclusion of queer people from juries erases a valuable
perspective in the distribution of justice in both civil and criminal
cases, and erodes public faith in the jury system as a whole. The
White Night Riots of 1979 demonstrate what that loss of faith
meant to the queer community of San Francisco. Building on
Batson’s protections with clear rules will help change perceptions of
the jury and ensure that all citizens have the same chance to deliver
justice.
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